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Articles
The Formalist Resistance to Unconstitutional
Constitutional Amendments
RICHARD ALBERT,† MALKHAZ NAKASHIDZE, AND TARIK OLCAY‡
Many courts around the world have either asserted or exercised the power to invalidate a
constitutional amendment. But we should not take the increasing prevalence of the doctrine of
unconstitutional constitutional amendment as evidence of its appropriateness for all
constitutional states. It is imperative that constitutional actors know that there is another answer
to the question whether an amendment can be unconstitutional. We have three purposes in this
Article, and we seek to fulfill each of them with reference to three jurisdictions in particular—
France, Georgia, and Turkey—whose constitutions and attendant constitutional practices have
expressly rejected the doctrine in a way that reflects what we describe as their shared formalist
resistance to unconstitutional constitutional amendments. We seek first to demonstrate that the
doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional amendment has not yet matured into a global norm
of constitutionalism. We seek also to explain how a jurisdiction that expressly rejects the idea of
an unconstitutional constitutional amendment operates in the face of an amendment that would
otherwise be invalidated as unconstitutional in a jurisdiction that has adopted the doctrine. We
finally seek to evaluate what is gained and lost in a constitutional state by rejecting the doctrine.
We find that there are both democracy-enhancing and democracy-weakening consequences that
follow from the choice to reject the doctrine outright. Our larger purpose—to diversify our
thinking about what risks becoming seen as a necessary feature of constitutionalism but that
design and practice show plainly is not—is inherent in the project itself.
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INTRODUCTION—A GLOBAL TREND?
The most fascinating question in the study of modern constitutional change
raises something of a paradox: can a constitutional amendment be
unconstitutional? We once interpreted the formal rules of change codified in
constitutions as establishing the necessary and sufficient procedures for
amendments, but we know this is no longer true as a descriptive reality. Today
we can be no more certain that an amendment will be valid when it satisfies the
procedural strictures set out in the codified constitution than we can be certain
that a law passed by a legislature is constitutional.
Courts around the world—from Bangladesh to Belize, India to Peru,
Colombia to Taiwan—have either asserted or exercised the power to invalidate
a constitutional amendment.1 Courts have drawn from codified rules and extraconstitutional norms to declare that procedurally-perfect amendments are
nonetheless substantively void. Scholars have in recent years taken a keen
interest in this phenomenon, producing a burgeoning literature seeking both to
1. See YANIV ROZNAI, UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS: THE LIMITS
AMENDMENT POWERS 47–70 (2017).

OF
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explain and justify the judicial doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional
amendment.2 The dominant view in the field is overwhelmingly favorably
inclined toward the idea that courts should have the power to invalidate a
procedurally-perfect amendment they deem unconstitutional, even in cases
where the codified constitution does not entrench a formally unamendable rule.3
There are relatively few exceptions to the global chorus of voices in support
of the extraordinary judicial power to invalidate constitutional amendments.4
The dearth of contrary views reflects the normalization of the phenomenon Ran
Hirschl has identified as the “judicialization of mega-politics,” a now-common
phrase referring to the most important matters of political significance that
constitute, define and divide polities—and that are now often adjudicated by
courts.5 National courts today decide a host of decidedly political questions: the
winner of presidential elections,6 the legitimacy of political parties,7 and the self2. See Yaniv Roznai, Amendment Power, Constituent Power, and Popular Sovereignty, in THE
FOUNDATIONS AND TRADITIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 23, 24 (Richard Albert et al. eds., 2017);
Richard Albert, Nonconstitutional Amendments, 22 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 5, 9–10 (2009); Aharon Barak,
Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments, 44 ISR. L. REV. 321, 322 (2011) (“The . . . judicial review of the
constitutionality of a constitutional amendment—lies at the foundation of this paper.”); David Landau &
Rosalind Dixon, Constraining Constitutional Change, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 859, 861 (2015); Douglas
Linder, What in the Constitution Cannot Be Amended?, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 717, 728–33 (1981); Walter F. Murphy,
An Ordering of Constitutional Values, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 703, 754–57 (1980); Ulrich K. Preuss, The
Implications of “Eternity Clauses”: The German Experience, 44 ISR. L. REV. 429, 435 (2011); Yaniv Roznai,
Legisprudence Limitations on Constitutional Amendments? Reflections on the Czech Constitutional Court’s
Declaration of Unconstitutional Constitutional Act, 8 VIENNA J. ON INT’L CONST. L. 29, 30, 33–40 (2014); Yaniv
Roznai & Serkan Yolcu, An Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment—the Turkish Perspective: A Comment
on the Turkish Constitutional Court’s Headscarf Decision, 10 INT’L J. CONST. L. 175, 195–202 (2012); Md.
Ariful Islam Siddiquee, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments in South Asia: A Study of Constitutional
Limits on Parliaments’ Amending Power, 33 J.L. POL’Y & GLOBALIZATION 64, 65 (2015).
3. See, e.g., SUDHIR KRISHNASWAMY, DEMOCRACY AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN INDIA: A STUDY OF THE
BASIC STRUCTURE DOCTRINE 1–42 (2009); Carlos Bernal, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments in the
Case Study of Colombia: An Analysis of the Justification and Meaning of the Constitutional Replacement
Doctrine, 11 INT’L J. CONST. L. 339, 341 (2013) (providing an alternative theory other than the replacement
doctrine to justify judicial review of constitutional amendments); Rosalind Dixon & David Landau,
Transnational Constitutionalism and a Limited Doctrine of Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment, 13
INT’L J. CONST. L. 606, 613–14 (2015); Gábor Halmai, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments:
Constitutional Courts as Guardians of the Constitution?, 19 CONSTELLATIONS 182 (2012); Gary Jeffrey
Jacobsohn, An Unconstitutional Constitution? A Comparative Perspective, 4 INT’L J. CONST. L. 460 (2006).
4. See, e.g., JOEL I. COLÓN-RÍOS, WEAK CONSTITUTIONALISM: DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY AND THE
QUESTION OF CONSTITUENT POWER 67 (2012) (arguing that the doctrine of unconstitutional amendment is
susceptible to charges of democratic illegitimacy); cf. Richard Albert, Constitutional Amendment and
Dismemberment, 43 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 15 (2018) [hereinafter Albert, Constitutional Amendment and
Dismemberment] (“Today it is not uncommon for supreme or constitutional courts to annul a procedurallyperfect constitutional amendment . . . . [h]owever its increasing frequency does not make it any less
extraordinary nor any more reasonable.”); John R. Vile, Limitations on the Constitutional Amending Process, 2
CONST. COMMENT. 373, 383 (1985) (“[I]f the Court even did attempt to control the amendment process, that
power could as easily be used for ill as for good.”).
5. Ran Hirschl, The Judicialization of Mega-Politics and the Rise of Political Courts, 11 ANN. REV. POL.
SCI. 93, 97 (2008).
6. Id. at 100.
7. Id.
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determination of a people.8 Against this backdrop, invalidating a constitutional
amendment is just par for the course.
But we should not take the increasing prevalence of the doctrine of
unconstitutional constitutional amendment as evidence of its appropriateness for
all constitutional states. It may well be that the doctrine fits in a given
constitutional tradition and should be incorporated into its practices of
adjudication. But this is a choice for a state and its domestic actors to make
according to their own norms of governance. The politics of constitutionalism
must remain localized in their particularized social and political circumstances.
Otherwise, when combined with the enormous pressure on states in our day to
conform to what may appear to be generally accepted standards of global
constitutionalism, the trend toward adopting the doctrine of unconstitutional
constitutional amendment might overwhelm the capacity of a state to evaluate
whether the doctrine is right for itself in light of its own juridical history,
political context, and constitutional traditions.
The doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional amendment is most
certainly not a necessary feature of modern constitutionalism, nor even of the
narrower idea of modern liberal democracy. It is important for all constitutional
actors to know that there is another answer to the question whether an
amendment can be unconstitutional. Constitutional designers, adjudicators, and
amenders should know that it is an altogether reasonable choice to deny the
possibility of an unconstitutional constitutional amendment.
We have three purposes in this Article. We seek to fulfill each of them with
reference to three jurisdictions in particular—France, Georgia, and Turkey—
whose constitutions and attendant constitutional practices have expressly
rejected the doctrine of a substantively unconstitutional amendment. As we
show, none of their strategies is optimal but they do reveal some available
alternatives in constitutional practice. Their shared rejection of the doctrine
reflects what we describe as formalist resistance to unconstitutional
constitutional amendments. We seek first to demonstrate that the doctrine has
not yet matured into a global norm of constitutionalism. We seek also to explain
how a jurisdiction that expressly rejects the idea of an unconstitutional
constitutional amendment operates in the face of an amendment that would be
invalidated in a jurisdiction that has adopted the doctrine. Finally, we seek to
evaluate what is gained and lost in a constitutional state that rejects the doctrine
of unconstitutional constitutional amendment.
We find that there are both democracy-enhancing and democracyweakening consequences that follow from the choice to deny the doctrine
outright. Our larger purpose is inherent in the project itself: to diversify our
thinking about what risks becoming seen as a necessary feature of
constitutionalism but that design and practice show plainly is not. We therefore

8. Id. at 101, 103.
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speak also to constitutional designers seeking ways to structure the rules of
constitutional change so as to foreclose the doctrine of unconstitutional
constitutional amendment.
I. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS
The idea of an unconstitutional amendment is rooted in what its defenders
regard as democratic justifications in support of limits that constitutions should
properly place on political actors seeking to make modifications to the bargain
struck in the name of the people.9 Whether defenders of the idea are persuasive
is not our concern in this Article. Nor are we concerned with whether courts are
correct to apply the doctrine of unconstitutional amendment to annul
amendments they regard as violating their interpretation of what the constitution
requires. We are concerned instead with demonstrating that there is no global
norm of finding that constitutional amendments can be unconstitutional. We
begin here by explaining how courts arrive at the conclusion that an amendment
can indeed be unconstitutional. We then turn to identifying alternatives to that
approach.
A. TEXT AND CONTEXT
Controversial though it may be, invalidating a constitutional amendment
is, on one view, fully consistent with the design of the constitution where the
text expressly disallows amendments adopted in violation of a certain procedure
or contrary to a specified subject-matter protection. For example, the Greek
Constitution imposes an outright prohibition on constitutional amendments
within five years of a successfully completed amendment.10 One could therefore
construct a purely textual argument in defense of a Greek court’s judgment to
find unconstitutional an amendment that had been proposed and ratified three
years after a successful amendment. Similarly, Belgium explicitly disables the
amendment procedure in a time of regency.11 Accordingly, in the event of an
amendment to the powers of the Belgian king during a period of recognized
regency, a court could be justified to invalidate such an amendment since it
would squarely violate the constitutional text.
Another example comes from South Africa, where the constitution creates
an escalating framework of three different amendment procedures, each keyed
specifically to certain parts and provisions of the constitution and each

9. See infra Subpart I.B.
10. 1975 SYNTAGMA [SYN.] [CONSTITUTION] 2, art. 110, § 6 (Greece). This type of amendment restriction
may be classified as a temporal limitation, one of several forms of limitations on the amendment power. See
Richard Albert, Temporal Limitations in Constitutional Amendment, 21 REV. CONST. STUD. 37, 41–44 (2016).
11. 1994 CONST. art. 197 (Belg.). This type of limitation may be understood as a defensive mechanism that
disables the amendment procedure in certain periods of time that put pressure on a state, namely war, siege,
regency, exception, or emergency. See Richard Albert, The Structure of Constitutional Amendment Rules, 49
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 913, 955–56 (2014).
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increasing in its degree of difficulty.12 The easiest of the three thresholds
requires two-thirds support in the National Assembly,13 and the hardest requires
three-quarters support in both the National Assembly and the National Council
of Provinces, with a supporting vote of at least six provinces.14 An amendment
to the constitution’s hardest amendment procedure requires conformity with the
hardest procedure itself.15 But if an amendment were made to that procedure
using the easiest of the three thresholds, a court could be justified to invalidate
that amendment because it would run afoul of a specific textual prohibition on
the use of the amendment power.16
These three examples from Greece, Belgium, and South Africa introduce
the problem of unconstitutional amendment in its least controversial form. To
the extent there is an easy case to be made in favor of courts possessing the
power to evaluate the validity of an amendment, these three cases could well be
the best exhibits because each involves a court applying the plain meaning of
the constitutional text to violations of the procedures of constitutional
amendment. At a minimum, then, a reviewing court’s operating manual would
reveal the following rule: where the constitutional text is unambiguous about a
prohibition or a specific procedure, courts in jurisdictions that recognize the
power of judicial review stand on firm ground in policing whether political
actors are acting in conformity with those clear rules.
The case in favor of judicial review of constitutional amendments is weaker
where the constitutional text does not codify similarly precise rules about how
political actors may validly amend the constitution. Here, there are two scenarios
worth distinguishing:
(1) Where the constitution codifies a content-based prohibition against
amendment but states the prohibition at a high level of generality; and
(2) Where the constitution formally codifies no rule against constitutional
amendment.
Begin with the first scenario. The Constitution of the Czech Republic
codifies a rule against amending the democratic character of the state: “Any
changes in the essential requirements for a democratic state governed by the rule
of law are impermissible.”17 The Czech Constitutional Court relied on this
prohibition to invalidate an amendment intending to reduce the length of the
term of the Chamber of Deputies.18 For the court, the amendment violated this
unamendable rule protecting the essential requirements of democracy. The court
reasoned that if longer terms are invalid then so too must be shorter terms
12. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 74.
13. Id. § 74(3)(a).
14. Id. § 74(1).
15. Id.
16. Id. § 167(4).
17. Ústavní zákon č. 1/1993 Sb., Ústava České Republiky [Constitution of the Czech Republic] art. 9, § 2.
18. Nález Ústavního soudu ze dne 10.9.2009 (ÚS) [Decision of the Constitutional Court of Sept. 10, 2009],
sp.zn. Pl. ÚS 27/09 (Czech).
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because both violate “the principle of regular terms of office” that is central to
the spirit of the unamendable rule.19
Whether the Czech judgment was correct is less important than recognizing
that the outcome turned on a contingent view of what democracy requires. The
textual prohibition on amendment gives little guidance about how to determine
what is essential for a democratic state. Instead it is the Czech Constitutional
Court’s contextual judgment that prevails in light of what it believes the rule of
law requires of democracy. This may be precisely what we expect of judges—
and what we openly defer to them to decide—but it is important to recognize
that this codified rule preserving democracy differs from the procedural ones
highlighted above. It is a content-based prohibition that requires courts to make
a judgment, in all likelihood a contestable one, about whether the amendment is
in its substance compatible with the textual prohibition on democracy.
The case for the judicial review of constitutional amendments is at its
weakest in the second scenario where the constitution formally codifies no rule
against constitutional amendment. The Indian Constitution is the prime example.
Its text confers plenary power on the national and state legislatures to amend the
constitution, without any formally unamendable rule standing in the way.20
Despite this relatively easy formal amendment rule, the Indian Supreme Court’s
first interpretation of the rule confirmed what the text says in its plain language:
that the formal amendment power is subject to no limitations.21 But the court
reversed course sixteen years later when it held that the amendment power could
not be employed to violate fundamental constitutional rights.22 Yet the court
moderated its astounding reversal, holding that it would exercise its new role of
policing the amendment power only prospectively. Six years later, the court
unveiled what is now known as the “basic structure doctrine,” which authorizes
courts to invalidate amendments that violate the Indian Constitution’s basic
structure.23 Precisely what constitutes the constitution’s “basic structure” is
nowhere expressly identified in its text but instead arises from the court’s
interpretation of the Indian Constitution’s internal coherence, stated values, and
norms of liberal constitutionalism, including the supremacy of the constitution,
the republican and democratic forms of government, the secular character of the
state, the separation of powers, and federalism.24 The court later exercised its
power to strike down amendments when faced with properly-passed
amendments that sought to limit the court’s authority to review constitutional
amendments.25

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. § VI/a.
INDIA CONST. art. 368, § 2.
Sri Sankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India, (1952) 1 SCR 89 (India).
Golaknath v. State of Punjab, (1967) 2 SCR 762 (India).
Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225 (India).
Id. ¶ 316.
Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCR 206 (India).
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It is difficult to justify the invalidation of constitutional amendments in
India in comparison to the other cases we have encountered. In contrast to the
cases from Greece and Belgium, the Indian Constitution does not establish strict
procedural limitations on constitutional amendment that could justify a court
striking down an amendment that fails to conform to specific rules on the process
by which the text is amended. Nor was an escalating structure of amendment the
basis of the Indian Supreme Court’s construction of the basic structure doctrine
or its actual use when it invalidated a procedurally-perfect amendment.26 The
Indian Constitution differs also from the Constitution of the Czech Republic and
others like it, which codify a formally unamendable rule at a high level of
subject-matter generality. In these jurisdictions, there is a textual referent for the
court’s action. In India, however, the lack of textually codified limitations on the
amendment power denies the basic structure doctrine the full force it might
otherwise enjoy—and it invites the claim that the court is overstepping the
explicit boundaries set by the constitution about how the court should exercise
its powers.
B. THE DEMOCRATIC JUSTIFICATION
Yet there may be a democratic justification for a court to invalidate
amendments in the absence of a formally unamendable rule. Even in what we
have described as the weakest scenario within which a court could invalidate a
procedurally-perfect amendment—where, as in India, the constitution formally
codifies no rule against amendment—one can build an argument in defense of a
court relying on the unwritten constitution to invalidate an amendment to its text.
The best argument offered thus far to make sense of a court invalidating a
constitutional amendment is anchored in the theory of constituent power, first
articulated by Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès, a French political theorist whose
principal interest was to build a theory to protect the essential right of the people
to choose the meaning of their constitution and how it should change.27
According to this theory of constituent power, only the people may create and,
by its creation, legitimate a new constitution.28 The people’s representatives
have the considerably lesser power only to make changes to the constitution
provided those changes are consistent with the structure and spirit of the people’s
constitution.29 Any change more far-reaching than that—one that alters the core
commitments of the constitution—must be authorized by the people themselves,
and as a result legitimated by them. For Sieyès, the people embody the
constituent power, meaning the supreme body that constitutes all others. These
other bodies are inferior to the people and their constituent power; these are
26. Id. at 215.
27. See EMMANUEL JOSEPH SIEYES, QU’EST-CE
(Éditions du Boucher 2002) (1789) (Fr.).
28. Id. at 53.
29. Id.

QUE LE

TIERS-ETAT? [WHAT IS

THE

THIRD ESTATE ?]
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described in the scholarly literature as the constituted powers. These constituted
powers include the legislature, the executive and courts as well. The legal fiction
of the theory of constituent power holds that these representative bodies of
constituted powers are created, authorized or regulated by the constitution,
which in turn has been created by the people. The bottom line, then, is this:
constituted powers are bound by the rules established in the constitution by the
constituent power.
The democratic foundations of the doctrine of unconstitutional
constitutional amendment begin now to come into focus. These foundations are
anchored in the delegation theory of constitutional change. Given that the people
have created the constitution and delegated to their representatives only the
limited power to modify the constitution in ways that keep the constitution
aligned with its original form and values, the constituted powers cannot make
changes to the constitution authorized by the constituent power without doing
violence to the expressed will of the people.30 Only the people themselves
exercising their constituent power may make such changes to the constitution.
Seen in this light, where a court invalidates a constitutional amendment passed
by the actors authorized by the constitution to make amendments, we can
certainly describe this action as stifling a proximate form of democratic
expression—the considered judgment of the amending actors. But this argument
would miss the larger picture. The choice a court makes to invalidate an
amendment that it believes violates the constitution is a vindication of the
supreme democratic choice originally made by the people to create the
constitution. On this view, what first seems to be an undemocratic arrogation of
power by courts is instead a justifiable judicial intervention to protect the terms
of the original bargain approved by the people.
Yet this justification does not resonate in all constitutional states nor is it
likely to take root in the self-understanding of all political actors, including
judges on the highest courts of those countries that have rejected the doctrine of
unconstitutional constitutional amendment. As we will show in the next three
Parts, there is a strong front of resistance to the doctrine of unconstitutional
amendment around the world, both in countries we may regard as champions of
liberal democracy and in those where the values of liberal democracy are in
formation or under attack. We might expect this resistance in the latter group but
not in the former, and yet countries in both groups share this antagonism to the
doctrine of unconstitutional amendment. What unites all three countries in their
resistance to the doctrine of unconstitutional amendment is shared through a
distinguishable set of formalist values in making, changing, and legitimating
higher law.

30. The most theoretically rich account of this idea of delegation appears in ROZNAI, supra note 1, at 105–
34.
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II. ULTRA-FORMALISM IN THE REPUBLIC OF GEORGIA
One possible approach to the idea of an unconstitutional constitutional
amendment is to reject it outright on purely formalist grounds. Formalism is
rooted in a commitment to rules that derive their legitimacy from their clarity,
consistent application, public accessibility and their widely shared acceptance
as authoritative.31 As with most theories of constitutional interpretation and
enforcement, formalism can sometimes devolve into a caricature of even its best
self. This is the case in the Republic of Georgia, whose Constitutional Court has
taken what may be described, as an ultra-formalist approach to adjudicating
constitutional amendments.
Faced with a constitutional text that makes no explicit mention of either
substantive unamendability or judicial authority to review constitutional
amendments, the Georgian Constitutional Court has refused to validate all
challenges to constitutional amendments.32 The court reasoned that once
Parliament adopts a constitutional amendment, it becomes part of the
constitution and is therefore unreviewable because the constitution cannot be
unconstitutional.33 The court has held that it lacks the constitutional authority to
review amendments.34 In this Part, we first explain the rules of constitutional
amendment in Georgia and then turn to the court’s case law in which it set out
the limits to its own authority to review amendments.
A. CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT IN THE REPUBLIC OF GEORGIA
Prior to the coming-into-force of a series of amendments to Georgia’s
constitution on October 28, 2018, amending the Georgian Constitution required
Parliament to consider a draft law for either a general or partial amendment,
submitted either by more than half of the total number of members of Parliament
or at least 200,000 eligible voters.35 An amendment proposal became valid
provided Parliament kept debate on the draft amendment open for at least one
month, and then voted by three-quarters in favor of the amendment in two
successive sessions of Parliament (separated by an interval of at least three
months).36 The final steps involved the President of the Republic signing and

31. For general readings on formalism, see Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1175 (1989); Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509 (1988); Mark V. Tushnet, Anti-Formalism
in Recent Constitutional Theory, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1502 (1985).
32. We discuss these cases infra Subpart II.B in greater detail: Saqartvelos Sakonstitucio Sasamartlo
[Constitutional Court of Georgia] July 12, 2010, N2/2/486; Saqartvelos Sakonstitucio Sasamartlo [Constitutional
Court of Georgia] Oct. 24, 2012, N1/3/523; Saqartvelos Sakonstitucio Sasamartlo [Constitutional Court of
Georgia] Feb. 5, 2013, N1/1/549.
33. Saqartvelos Sakonstitucio Sasamartlo [Constitutional Court of Georgia] July 12, 2010, N2/2/486, § 2,
¶ 9.
34. Saqartvelos Sakonstitucio Sasamartlo [Constitutional Court of Georgia] Feb. 5, 2013, N1/1/549, § 2,
¶ 9.
35. 2018 K’ONST’IT’UTSIA [CONSTITUTION] art. 102, § 1 (Geor.).
36. Id. art. 102, §§ 2–3.
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promulgating the amendment.37 The constitution was clear that no amendment
could lawfully be made during a state of emergency or martial law.38 Today,
Georgia’s new amendment rules are largely similar with one important
difference—differential supermajorities are now required to ratify an
amendment.39
Georgian statutory law regulates the definition and relationship of legal
norms in the country. Although not formally part of the constitution, the Law of
Georgia on Normative Acts governs the formal rules of legal normativity. 40
Paragraph 1 of article 1 stipulates “[t]his law defines the types and hierarchy of
normative acts, the place of international agreements and treaties of Georgia in
the system of normative acts of Georgia, and general rules of preparing, adopting
(issuing), promulgating, applying, registering and systematising [sic] normative
acts.”41 Paragraph 2 of article 7 enumerates the constitution and “the
Constitutional Law of Georgia,” which refers to constitutional amendments,
among the types of legislative acts in Georgia.42 Paragraph 3 of article 7 states
the definitive hierarchy of norms in the Georgian legal system, and places the
constitution and the constitutional law at the same level—the highest—in the
hierarchy.43 Paragraph 2 of article 10 moreover states that “[t]he Constitutional
Law of Georgia is an integral part of the Constitution of Georgia. The
Constitutional Law of Georgia shall be adopted to . . . revise the Constitution of
Georgia.”44 This equivalence in the Georgian legal system between the
constitution and amendments to it has a considerable impact on the
Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence on its authority to review and possibly
invalidate constitutional amendments.45
Since its adoption in 1995, the Georgian Constitution has been amended
thirty-five times.46 While most of these have been more housekeeping than
transformative, two major constitutional amendments reforming the political
37. Id. art. 102, § 4.
38. Id. art. 103.
39. See Constitutional Law of Georgia No. 1324 of 13 Oct. 2017; Constitutional Law of Georgia No. 2071
of 23 Mar. 2018 (requiring that if an amendment is supported by at least two-thirds of the total number of the
Members of Parliament, the amendment will be sent to the President for promulgation upon the support of at
least two thirds of the total number of the Members of next Parliament; but that if an amendment is supported
by at least three-fourths of the total number of the Members of Parliament, the amendment will be sent directly
to the President for promulgation).
40. Law of Georgia on Normative Acts (Act No. 1876/ 2009).
41. Id. art. 1, § 1.
42. Id. art. 7, § 2(a).
43. Id. art. 7, § 3.
44. Id. art. 10, § 2.
45. See Dimitry Gegenava, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment: Three Judgments from the
Practice of the Constitutional Court of Georgia, 5 S. CAUCASUS L.J. 396, 397 (2014) (arguing that the main
problem with regard to the legal status of constitutional amendments in Georgia is that it is regulated at the infraconstitutional level by the Law on Normative Acts).
46. For a full list of the amendments, see Constitution of Georgia, LEGIS. HERALD GEOR.,
https://matsne.gov.ge/en/document/view/30346 (last visited Mar. 15, 2019).
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system became law in 2004 and 2010, and a third was adopted in 2017 to enter
into force in 2018.47 The 2004 constitutional amendment emerged in the
aftermath of the Rose Revolution with the stated aim of converting the country
from a presidential to semi-presidential system.48 Yet the new form of
government did not create sufficient checks and balances against the
concentration of power.49 Hence the 2010 constitutional amendment, which
changed the form of government, though this time from semi-presidential to one
resembling a parliamentary system, in the process shifting significant executive
powers from the President as an individual to the government as a body.50 The
latest reform, recommended by a constitutional commission convened in
December 2016,51 and then adopted by Parliament in September 2017,52 makes
dramatic changes. Most notably, the package of amendments—which one of us
has described as amounting to a constitutional dismemberment rather than a
simple amendment53—contemplates the indirect election of the President
through an Electoral College and creates a pure parliamentary system. The
amendment also makes substantial reforms to the legislature, including its
election rules, and it modifies the form and authority of the judiciary, including
the Constitutional Court.54
B. OUTRIGHT REJECTION OF THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
DOCTRINE
Although there have been several amendments to the Georgian
Constitution, only three have provoked challenges to the Constitutional Court.
As we discuss below, each of the three challenges involved a 2006 constitutional
amendment stipulating that presidential and parliamentary elections would be
held jointly between October 1, 2008 and December 31, 2008, the precise date
47. The Constitutional Law of Georgia on Amendments to the Constitution of Georgia, LEGIS. HERALD
GEOR., #1324-rs, https://matsne.gov.ge/ka/document/view/3811818?publication=1 (last visited Mar. 15, 2019).
48. 2004 K’ONST’IT’UTSIA [CONSTITUTION] art. 5 (Geor.).
49. See Eur. Comm’n for Democracy Through Law (Venice Comm’n), Opinion on the Draft Amendments
to the Constitution of Georgia, 58th Sess., Op. No. 281/2004 (Mar. 29, 2004).
50. 2010 K’ONST’IT’UTSIA [CONSTITUTION] art. 21 (Geor.).
51. See Dimitry Gegenava, Retrospection of the Constitutional Reforms of Georgia: In Search of the Holy
Grail, 8 S. CAUCASUS L.J. 237, 241 (2017).
52. Parliament of Georgia Passed the Draft Constitutional Law with the III Reading, PARLIAMENT GEOR.
(Sept. 26, 2017), http://parliament.ge/en/saparlamento-saqmianoba/plenaruli-sxdomebi/plenaruli-sxdomebi_
news/saqartvelos-parlamentma-konstituciuri-kanonis-proeqti-mesame-mosmenit-miigo.page.
These amendments were approved by Parliament on September 26, 2017 in the third and final reading. The
President then vetoed the bill, which was later overturned by Parliament, and the amendment was officially
published on October 13, 2017. On March 23, 2018 some parts of these amendments, mainly related to electoral
system, were revised.
53. Albert, Constitutional Amendment and Dismemberment, supra note 4, at 54–56.
54. See Eur. Comm’n for Democracy Through Law (Venice Comm’n), Opinion on the Draft Revised
Constitution as Adopted by the Parliament of Georgia at the Second Reading on 23 June 2017, 112th Sess., Op.
No. 876/2017 (Oct. 9, 2017); Eur. Comm’n for Democracy Through Law (Venice Comm’n), Georgia: Opinion
on the Draft Revised Constitution, 111th Sess., Op. No. 876/2017 (June 19, 2017).
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to be determined by the President.55 The amendment understandably proved
controversial because it changed the elected term of office.56 The first challenge
also involved a 2004 amendment, which we introduce below. The important
point for our purposes is that the court rejected all claims in each of these three
cases, and along with them also the unconstitutional amendment doctrine.
The Georgian Constitution authorizes the Constitutional Court to review a
broad range of official conduct.57 But the constitution’s lengthy enumeration
does not include the Constitutional Court’s authority to review constitutional
amendments. This power appears to be denied to the court.58
In light of the absence in the Georgian Constitution of any express
authorization for (or prohibition on) judicial review of constitutional
amendments, the Constitutional Court’s interpretation of its own power has
settled the matter. On each of the three occasions between 2010 and 2013, the
court rejected the idea of an unconstitutional amendment, ruling that once an
amendment is enacted it becomes part of the constitution—and that the court
cannot exercise judicial review of any part of the constitution.
The first case arose in 2009. A claimant challenged the constitutional
amendments N3272-RS of February 6, 2004 and N4133-RS of December 27,
2006, arguing that these amendments had been adopted by an illegitimate
parliament and therefore violated the constitutional amendment procedure set
out in article 102 of the constitution.59 The claimant contended also that the
amendment violated the right to equality in political life as protected in
paragraph 1 of article 38 of the constitution, as well as paragraph 1 of article 44
which stipulates “[e]veryone who lives in Georgia shall be obliged to observe
the Constitution and legislation of Georgia.”60 For the court, the question was
effectively only whether it had authority over the normative acts. Referring to
paragraph 2 of article 10 of the Law of Georgia on Normative Acts, which
affirms that constitutional amendments are an integral part of the constitution,
the court argued that constitutional amendments have the same normative value
as primary constitutional norms.61 Reviewing constitutional amendments,
therefore, would be to review the “constitutionality of the norms of the
55. 2007 K’ONST’IT’UTSIA [CONSTITUTION] art. 2 (Geor.).
56. Id.
57. K’ONST’IT’UTSIA [CONSTITUTION] art. 60 (Geor.).
58. We could perhaps find justification in the constitution for the court to exercise judicial review of
constitutional amendments, specifically in paragraph 4-j of article 60, which stipulates that the court shall
“exercise other powers determined by the Constitution.” Id. art. 60, § 4(j). This potentially leaves open the
possibility of judicial review of non-listed normative acts. See Besarion Zoidze, Problems with the Verification
of Constitutional Norms and Constitutionality, 8 CONST. L. REV. 3, 8 (2015) (arguing that this clause read
together with the Organic Law on the Constitutional Court of Georgia justifies procedural review of
constitutional amendments).
59. Saqartvelos Sakonstitucio Sasamartlo [Constitutional Court of Georgia] July 12, 2010, N2/2/486.
60. 2014 K’ONST’IT’UTSIA [CONSTITUTION] art. 44, § 1 (repealed 2018) (Geor.); accord Saqartvelos
Sakonstitucio Sasamartlo [Constitutional Court of Georgia] July 12, 2010, N2/2/486.
61. Law of Georgia on Normative Acts (Act No. 1876/ 2009).
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Constitution.”62 And this, according to the court, was beyond its jurisdiction.
The court ruled the claim inadmissible and did not address its merits.63
A second case challenging the constitutionality of an amendment reached
the court in 2012.64 In this case, a claimant challenged the constitutionality of
two 2006 constitutional amendments that added the following rules to section 2
of article 50 of the constitution:
Regular parliamentary elections shall be held during the month of October in the
calendar year when Parliament’s term of office expires. The President of Georgia
shall fix the date of elections not later than 60 days before the elections.65

This amendment furthermore amended section 9 of article 70 of the
constitution as follows:
Regular presidential elections shall be held in the month of October of a calendar
year when the President’s powers expire. The President of Georgia shall fix the
date of elections not later than 60 days before the elections.66

The claimant argued that extending the parliamentary term by five months
and the presidential term by nine months violated articles 49 and 70 of the
constitution, which govern parliamentary and presidential elections,
respectively.67 The claimant also contended that these term extensions violated
the right of citizens to run for the presidency, the right to free expression, and
the constitutional function of the people as a source of state authority defined in
article 28, including his own right to participate in parliamentary and presidential
elections.68
Following its reasoning from the 2010 case, the court stressed the
normative status of constitutional amendments as stipulated by the constitution
and the organic laws.69 It explained the hierarchy of norms in the Georgian legal
order and concluded that a constitutional amendment, as an integral part of the
constitution, sits on the top of the constitutional hierarchy.70 The court concluded
that it is authorized to review only those normative acts sitting below the
constitution in the hierarchy, and held that it did not have the authority to review
the constitutionality of any part of the constitution.71 The court again rejected
the challenge to the amendment.72

62. Saqartvelos Sakonstitucio Sasamartlo [Constitutional Court of Georgia] July 12, 2010, N2/2/486, § II,
¶ 3.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id.
Saqartvelos Sakonstitucio Sasamartlo [Constitutional Court of Georgia] Oct. 24, 2012, N1/3/523.
2006 K’ONST’IT’UTSIA [CONSTITUTION] art. 50, § 2.1 (repealed 2018) (Geor.).
Id. art. 70, § 9 (repealed 2018).
Saqartvelos Sakonstitucio Sasamartlo [Constitutional Court of Georgia] Oct. 24, 2012, N1/3/523, § I,

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.
Id. § II, ¶ 4.
Id. § II, ¶¶ 3–4.
Id. § II, ¶¶ 4–5.
Id. § III, ¶ 1.

¶ 5.
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The last case on constitutional amendments is from 2013. Section 2-c of
article 1 of the 2006 amendment was again the subject of the challenge, only this
time the claim was that it violated articles 17 and 28 of the constitution, namely
the protection of human dignity and the right to participate in elections.73 In this
case, the claimant argued that although the Constitutional Court is not directly
authorized to review constitutional amendments, the court has a constitutional
duty to review the compliance of normative acts with the basic rights and
freedoms protected in the constitution.74 In the claimant’s view, by granting
retroactive effect to the constitutional norm regulating the public authority of the
President, the Parliament had violated the basic principles of public law.75 The
presidential election of 2008 had been held ten months sooner than the
constitutionally prescribed date, which would have had the effect of extending
the President’s term. This extension, for the claimant, violated section 1 of
article 70 of the constitution.76 The claimant also argued that the court’s
authority over constitutional amendments “derives from the authority and the
general logic of the mission of the Constitutional Court.”77
In this third and most recent case, the court discussed the question whether
it had the authority to review the conformity of constitutional amendments with
codified rights. The court set out its two functions as it sees them: first, to ensure
the functioning of state authority within the framework established by the
constitution; and second, to protect human rights from unreasonable interference
by public authorities.78 The court argued, however, that it could not properly
serve these functions without respecting the limits of constitutional authority
operating upon it, the foremost limits being the ones codified in the
constitution.79 The court could not read the constitution as granting it the power
to review amendments because, in the court’s own view, constitutional norms—
including amendments—create a unified constitutional-legal order and this
constitutes the standard against which inferior normative acts are to be reviewed
by the Constitutional Court. For the court, its authority was at an end when the
challenge concerned the constitution itself.
Interestingly, the Constitutional Court of Georgia made express reference
to the Venice Commission’s finding that there is no consensus in public law on
the authority of constitutional courts over constitutional amendments.80 The
court concluded that in the absence of formally unamendable clauses—even if
there is a substantive hierarchy among constitutional norms—there exists no
73. Saqartvelos Sakonstitucio Sasamartlo [Constitutional Court of Georgia] Feb. 5, 2013, N1/1/549.
74. Id. § II, ¶ 5.
75. Id. § II, ¶ 12.
76. Id. § II, ¶ 13.
77. Id. § I, ¶ 5.
78. Id. § II, ¶ 5.
79. Id.
80. Id. § II, ¶ 10; Eur. Comm’n for Democracy Through Law (Venice Comm’n), Report on Constitutional
Amendment, 81st Sess., Study No. 469/2008, ¶¶ 225–37 (Jan. 10, 2009).
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formal hierarchy.81 According to the court, the resolution of contestations on the
constitutional plane in the hierarchy of legal norms is left to the political process
in Georgia.82 The court added a further point: in order for the court to acquire
the authority to review constitutional amendments, the principle of separation of
powers demands that the constitution itself provide a clear basis for the court to
exercise this power within clearly defined parameters.83
In sum, the Constitutional Court of Georgia has consistently refused to
review the constitutionality of constitutional amendments by ruling that once an
amendment has been enacted, it forms an integral part of the constitution. As
constitution-level norms, amendments are not subject to constitutional review.
In response to this ultra-formalist practice of the court, some have suggested that
explicit unamendability should be introduced into the Georgian Constitution,84
while others, relying on the non-exhaustive list of its authorities stipulated in the
constitution, insist that the court already possesses within its toolkit the power
to review constitutional amendments.85
III. ENFORCING DEMOCRATIC PROCEDURES IN TURKEY
An alternative model of resistance is apparent in Turkey, whose
constitution limits the Constitutional Court to exercising only formal procedural
review of amendments. However, the court has devised ways of manipulating
this limitation to exercise substantive review in disguise. In this Part we explain
how amendment rules are structured in Turkey and also reveal how even a rigid
rule limiting courts to only procedural review is prone to manipulation by an
aggressive court.
A. CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT IN TURKEY
Amending the constitution in Turkey is a quite complicated process of
alternative paths.86 Initiation requires the agreement of one-third of the total
number of parliamentarians, after which the proposal must be debated twice in
a plenary session of Parliament.87 At least three-fifths of parliamentarians must
81. Saqartvelos Sakonstitucio Sasamartlo [Constitutional Court of Georgia], N1/1/549, § II, ¶ 11; see also
Besik Loladze, Konstituciis Tsvlilebebis Konstitutsiurobis Kontrolis Perspektiva Saqartveloshi [Perspectives of
Constitutional Review of Constitutional Amendments in Georgia], EMC (Nov. 11, 2014),
https://emc.org.ge/2014/11/11/experts-third (supporting the court’s argument and contending that the authority
of the formation of unamendability guarantees is upon the legislature and not the Constitutional Court).
82. Saqartvelos Sakonstitucio Sasamartlo [Constitutional Court of Georgia], N1/1/549, § II, ¶ 11.
83. Id.
84. Vakhushti Menabde, Revision of Constitution of Georgia—What Ensures Legitimacy of Supreme Law,
in FROM SUPERPRESIDENTIALISM TO PARLIAMENTARISM: CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS IN GEORGIA 116, 127
(Ghia Nodia & Davit Afrasidze eds., 2013); Elene Janelidze, Judicial Review of Constitutional Amendments in
Georgia, France and Germany—the Quest for Eternity 33–34 (Apr. 1, 2016) (unpublished L.L.M. short thesis,
Central European University), http://www.etd.ceu.hu/2016/janelidze_elene.pdf; Loladze, supra note 81.
85. See Zoidze, supra note 58.
86. See TÜRKIYE CUMHURIYETI ANAYASASI [CONSTITUTION] art. 175 (Turk.).
87. Id.
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then approve the proposal for it to proceed, but two alternatives present
themselves depending on the strength of the approval vote.88 If at least twothirds vote in favor, the President has the option of either approving the proposal
into law, sending it back to Parliament for reconsideration, or putting it to a
referendum.89 However, if fewer than two-thirds vote in favor, the President
cannot approve the bill but has the choice of either sending it back or putting it
to a referendum.90 If the bill is sent back to Parliament after earning at least a
two-thirds vote, and is approved again by at least a two-thirds vote, the President
again is given the choice of either approving it outright or putting the bill or
some of its articles to a referendum.91 But if the amendment proposal had earned
a small majority vote, a referendum on the bill becomes compulsory.92
The Turkish Constitution also codifies substantive limitations on
amendment.93 No amendments are permitted to “[t]he provision of Article 1
regarding the form of the State being a Republic, the characteristics of the
Republic in Article 2, and the provisions of Article 3.”94 When elaborated
beyond these references by incorporation, the list of unamendable items includes
the republican form of the state, the nationalism of Atatürk, the fundamental
tenets set forth in the preamble, the principles of democracy, secularism, social
state, the rule of law, respect for human rights, as well as the provisions
establishing the integrity, the official language, the flag, the national anthem and
the capital of the country.95
Earlier Turkish Constitutions—the 1924 and 1961 versions—also codified
explicit forms of unamendability,96 but only for the republican state form,
patterned after the unamendability clause in the French Constitution.97 Both of
these superseded Turkish Constitutions also protected the characteristics and
national symbols of the state, but these were not expressly designated as
unamendable.98

88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See Ergun Özbudun, Judicial Review of Constitutional Amendments in Turkey, 15 EUR. PUB. L. 533,
534 (2009).
94. TÜRKIYE CUMHURIYETI ANAYASASI [CONSTITUTION] art. 4 (Turk.).
95. Id. arts. 1, 2, 3, 4.
96. TÜRKIYE CUMHURIYETI ANAYASASI [CONSTITUTION] art. 102 (1924) (repealed 1960) (Turk.);
TÜRKIYE CUMHURIYETI ANAYASASI [CONSTITUTION] art. 9 (1961) (repealed 1982) (Turk.).
97. 1958 CONST. art. 89 (rev. 2008) (Fr.) (“The republican form of government shall not be the object of
any amendment.”).
98. TÜRKIYE CUMHURIYETI ANAYASASI [CONSTITUTION] art. 2 (1924) (repealed 1960) (Turk.); TÜRKIYE
CUMHURIYETI ANAYASASI [CONSTITUTION] arts. 2, 3 (1961) (repealed 1982) (Turk.).
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B. SUBSTANTIVE REVIEW AS PROCEDURAL REVIEW IN TURKEY
The Turkish Constitutional Court’s review of constitutional amendments
is a complicated story. The court has neither been consistent in its interpretation
of the legal enforceability of unamendable clauses nor in its interpretation of its
own authority over constitutional amendments. Historically across three
separate eras, the court has found ways to exercise substantive judicial review
of amendments even where it has been severely limited in its discretionary
authority in relation to amendments. From 1961 to 1971, only the republican
form of the state was unamendable99 and the constitution was silent on the
court’s judicial review authority over amendments.100 From 1971 to 1980, the
same unamendable rule existed but the constitution authorized the court to
review amendments only as to their form, not their content.101 And since 1982,
unamendability has expanded in scope, but the constitution continues to
authorize judicial review of amendments only as to their form, and even still to
only three specifically enumerated formal criteria that do not at all relate to the
content of the amendments.102 And yet in all three eras since 1961, the court has
exercised substantive judicial review of amendments.
A formalist understanding has underlain the design of constitutional
unamendability in Turkey. Following the constitution’s initial silence on the
question, constitutional reforms directed the Constitutional Court away from
substantive review of constitutional amendments at two important turning
points, namely by an amendment in 1971 and later by the 1982 constitution. In
both attempts at restraining the court, however, the reformers insisted upon
authorizing the court to review only the procedural propriety of constitutional
amendments. Yet these efforts to constrain the court failed. The court exercised
substantive review of amendments from 1975 to 1977 and again from 2008 to
2010. What is utterly fascinating is that in establishing the basis for legally
enforceable substantive unamendability the court resorted to arguments rooted
in formalism. The court argued that policing the formal procedural correctness
of an amendment required it to inquire into the substantive merits of the
amendment. The irony is that the court exercised substantive review of
amendments in the name of formal procedural review.
Formal unamendability in Turkey dates to 1924, but its judicial
enforceability emerged as an issue only after the establishment of the
Constitutional Court in the 1961 constitution. Shortly after its creation, the court
hinted in an obiter that it would review constitutional amendments against the
standard set by the constitution’s unamendable rule, arguing that an
“amendment” can only be progressive and that any effort to regress from the

99.
100.
101.
102.

TÜRKIYE CUMHURIYETI ANAYASASI [CONSTITUTION] art. 9 (1961) (repealed 1982) (Turk.).
Id. art. 147.
Id. (amended 1971).
TÜRKIYE CUMHURIYETI ANAYASASI [CONSTITUTION] art. 148 (Turk.).
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promise of the constitution or to modify the core “essence” of the 1961
constitution could not be properly regarded as an “amendment.”103
Until the 1971 constitutional reform, the Constitutional Court had reviewed
only two constitutional amendments. In the first case, the court struck down on
procedural grounds an amendment reinstating the political rights of the
Democratic Party politicians—rights that had been taken away in the aftermath
of the 1960 military coup.104 In justifying its authority to review constitutional
amendments, the court argued that it had the constitutional authority to review
laws and since a constitutional amendment is formally a law, it is subject to
constitutional review like all others.105 Although the court stated that
constitutional amendments are subject to both procedural and substantive
review, it concluded that the amendment had not been enacted procedurally
properly and hence the court did not engage in substantive review.106
In the second case, the court reviewed on both procedural and substantive
grounds an amendment that extended by sixteen months the ordinarily six-year
term limit for certain senators.107 In upholding the amendment, the court
declared that it had the constitutional authority to protect the constitution against
the sovereignty of the majority.108
The court’s bold pronouncement drew an equally bold response.
Parliament passed an amendment overriding the constitution’s silence on the
judicial review of amendments.109 Parliament amended article 147 of the 1961
constitution to explicitly state that the Constitutional Court has the authority to
review constitutional amendments only on the formal grounds set forth by the
constitutional amendment rules.110 The constitution was amended, therefore,
with the purpose of restricting the court from engaging in substantive review.
And yet the court nevertheless continued to exercise substantive review of

103. Anayasa Mahkemesi [AYM] [Constitutional Court] Sept. 26, 1965, E. 1963/173, K. 1965/40 4
AYMKD 290, 329 (Turk.).
104. Anayasa Mahkemesi [AYM] [Constitutional Court] June 16, 1970, E. 1970/1, K. 1970/31 8 AYMKD
313, 332–33 (Turk.).
105. Id. at 322. A similar reasoning was put forward by the majority in the Indian Supreme Court’s
Golaknath decision three years earlier, where the Court struck down a constitutional amendment on the grounds
that it abridged fundamental rights. Golaknath v. State of Punjab, (1967) 2 SCR 762 (India); see also S. P. Sathe,
India: From Positivism to Structuralism, in INTERPRETING CONSTITUTIONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 215, 244
(Jeffrey Goldsworthy ed., 2006).
106. Anayasa Mahkemesi [AYM] [Constitutional Court] June 16, 1970, E. 1970/1, K. 1970/31 8 AYMKD
313 (Turk.).
107. Anayasa Mahkemesi [AYM] [Constitutional Court] Apr. 13, 1971, E. 1970/41, K. 1971/37 9 AYMKD
416, 431 (Turk.).
108. Id. at 428–29.
109. This amendment was passed in the aftermath of the 1971 military memorandum. 1488 SAYILI KANUN
[LAW NO. 1488] Sept. 20, 1971, Resmi Gazete [Official Gazette] No. 13964 (Turk.).
110. TÜRKIYE CUMHURIYETI ANAYASASI [CONSTITUTION] art. 147 (1961) (repealed 1982) (Turk.)
(emphasis added) (reading as amended: “The Constitutional Court shall review the conformity of laws and the
parliamentary rules of procedure to the Constitution and of constitutional amendments to the formal
requirements set out in the Constitution.”).
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amendments on six separate occasions thereafter until the adoption of the 1982
constitution, which remains in force today.
In the first case after the 1971 amendment, the Constitutional Court was
asked to review an amendment that created an exception in times of war to the
rule that “the majority of members of military courts should be qualified
judges.”111 In discussing its authority over constitutional amendments for the
first time since the 1971 amendment that sought to limit its power, the court
admitted that it no longer had the authority to exercise substantive review and
that its review would be confined only to formal review.112 This admission,
however, came with a twist. The court went on to argue that the unamendable
rule incorporated both formal and substantive rules.113 First, it prohibited actual
amendments to the form of the state. And, second, it prohibited even proposing
of any such amendments.114 The second element, the court argued, was a formal
limitation the court was required to honor, but the court added that, in order to
properly complete its formal review of the amendment, it had to apply a test on
whether the amendment could in fact be proposed in the first place.115 The court
understood this to be a proposability test.116 Under this test, an amendment
would fail the formal criterion of proposability if in its substance it violated the
unamendable rule entrenched in the constitution.117
Using the same reasoning, the Constitutional Court reviewed five more
amendments before the 1980 military coup, three of which it struck down as
unconstitutional.118 In each of these cases, the court exercised substantive review
as a necessary feature of its formal review.
The 1982 constitution changed the rules of amendment considerably. In
addition to the republican form of state, the characteristics and symbols of the
state have also been explicitly given unamendability protection.119 Attentive to
the ways in which the court had in the past exceeded its delegated authority to
review only the form of amendments, the drafters of the new constitution again
made clear that the Constitutional Court can exercise only formal review and
expressly limited this power to three categories: (1) the required majority for

111. Anayasa Mahkemesi [AYM] [Constitutional Court] Apr. 15, 1975, E. 1973/19, K. 1975/87 13
AYMKD 403 (Turk.).
112. Id. at 426–27.
113. Id. at 429.
114. Id. at 429–31.
115. Id. at 431.
116. Id. at 430–41.
117. Id.
118. Anayasa Mahkemesi [AYM] [Constitutional Court] Sept. 27, 1977, E. 1977/82, K. 1977/117 15
AYMKD 444 (Turk.); Anayasa Mahkemesi [AYM] [Constitutional Court] Jan. 27, 1977, E. 1976/43, K. 1977/4
15 AYMKD 106 (Turk.); Anayasa Mahkemesi [AYM] [Constitutional Court] Oct. 12, 1976, E. 1976/26, K.
1976/47 14 AYMKD 287 (Turk.); Anayasa Mahkemesi [AYM] [Constitutional Court] Oct. 12, 1976, E.
1976/38, K. 1976/46 14 AYMKD 252 (Turk.); Anayasa Mahkemesi [AYM] [Constitutional Court] Mar. 23,
1976, E. 1975/167, K. 1976/19 14 AYMKD 118 (Turk.).
119. TÜRKIYE CUMHURIYETI ANAYASASI [CONSTITUTION] art. 4 (Turk.).

70.4-ALBERT (DO NOT DELETE)

April 2019]

4/2/2019 1:25 PM

FORMALIST RESISTANCE

659

proposing an amendment; (2) the required majority for voting on it; and (3) the
requirement that the amendment bill be debated twice in a plenary session.120
The first amendment to the 1982 constitution occurred in 1987. It lifted the
restrictions on the political rights of some politicians that had been imposed by
the 1980 military junta. The amendment was challenged in the Constitutional
Court on formal grounds. However, the claim—that it was improper for
Parliament simultaneously to pass an amendment and to put that amendment to
a referendum using the same act—did not fall under any of the three formal
criteria the constitution contemplates for the court to exercise its power to review
an amendment. Accordingly, the court rejected the request, holding that its
authority over constitutional amendments was limited to determining whether
the three enumerated formal criteria had been met.121 In 2007, two more
constitutional amendments were taken to the Constitutional Court, and in both
cases the court restricted its review to the three formal criteria, refusing to
engage in substantive review or in any other form of formal review.122
The court abandoned its restraint when reviewing constitutional
amendments in its infamous headscarf judgment in 2008.123 The context was
highly charged: the governing Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) closure
case was pending before the Constitutional Court for its activities allegedly
violating the unamendable principle of secularism.124 The amendment before the
court sought to lift the ban on religious headscarves worn by women at
universities. Constrained by a much more rigid limitation on its authority over
constitutional amendments as compared to previous eras, the court devised a
novel justification for its authority to exercise substantive review of amendments
in relation to the unamendable rules in the constitution. The court argued that
satisfying the first enumerated procedural condition of the required majority for
proposal required also meeting the condition of proposability.125 This
proposability test required the court to engage in substantive review and, as it
had done before, the court again exercised substantive review in the name of
formal review. The court concluded that the amendment violated the
unamendable principle of secularism and struck it down as unconstitutional.126

120. Id. art. 148, para. 2, cl. 1.
121. Anayasa Mahkemesi [AYM] [Constitutional Court] June 18, 1987, E. 1987/9, K. 1987/15 23 AYMKD
282, 285–86 (Turk.).
122. Anayasa Mahkemesi [AYM] [Constitutional Court] Nov. 27, 2007, E. 2007/99, K. 2007/86 45
AYMKD 429, 443–44 (Turk.); Anayasa Mahkemesi [AYM] [Constitutional Court] July 5, 2007, E. 2007/72, K.
2007/68 44 AYMKD 1053, 1087–94 (Turk.).
123. Anayasa Mahkemesi [AYM] [Constitutional Court] June 5, 2008, E. 2008/16, K. 2008/116 45
AYMKD 1195 (Turk.).
124. See Aslı Bâli, Courts and Constitutional Transition: Lessons from the Turkish Case, 11 INT’L J. CONST.
L. 666, 688–90 (2013).
125. Anayasa Mahkemesi [AYM] [Constitutional Court] June 5, 2008, E. 2008/16, K. 2008/116 45
AYMKD 1195, 1233 (Turk.).
126. Id. at 1240–41.
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This interpretation reads the constitution’s amendment rules against their
very purpose, which is to prohibit substantive judicial review of constitutional
amendments. The court has, for good reason, suffered criticism.127 Yet the court
nevertheless, struck down parts of another amendment in 2010.128 Repeating its
reasoning with regard to its authority to review the substance of the amendment
in relation to the unamendable rules, the court engaged in substantive review.129
The court declared unconstitutional the proposed voting procedures for selecting
members for the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors and for the
Constitutional Court, and the proposed rule allowing the president to appoint
academics from political science and economics or senior executives violated
the unamendable principle of the “democratic state governed by rule of law.”130
In somewhat of a surprise, the court has recently returned to its pre-2008
position that it will respect the constitution’s explicit rule that the court is
authorized to review amendments only as to form. In a 2016 case brought by
seventy parliamentarians challenging an amendment that temporarily lifted
parliamentary immunity, the court declared that its authority over constitutional
amendments extends only to whether the required majorities for proposal and
voting have been met and the requirement of two debates has been observed.131
The case grew from the claim that although the law had taken the form of a
constitutional amendment, the subject matter of the amendment was the lifting
of parliamentary immunity—and since article 85 of the constitution
contemplates judicial review of parliamentary decisions lifting parliamentary
immunity before the Constitutional Court—this amendment should be subject
to judicial review.132 Returning to a formalist approach to defining the legal
status of the act of Parliament, the court dismissed the challenge by ruling that
the challenged act was indeed a constitutional amendment and that the challenge
brought did not fall into any of the three formal criteria set out in the
constitution.133 In the court’s unanimous judgment, we see clearly the court’s readoption of a formalist approach to unconstitutional amendments.134

127. See Albert, Constitutional Amendment and Dismemberment, supra note 4, at 26–29; Bâli, supra note
124, at 681–88; Levent Köker, Turkey’s Political-Constitutional Crisis: An Assessment of the Role of the
Constitutional Court, 17 CONSTELLATIONS 328, 335 (2010); Özbudun, supra note 93, at 537–38; Roznai &
Yolcu, supra note 2; Abdurrahman Saygili, What Is Behind the Headscarf Ruling of the Turkish Constitutional
Court?, 11 TURKISH STUD. 127 (2010).
128. Anayasa Mahkemesi [AYM] [Constitutional Court] July 7, 2010, E. 2010/49, K. 2010/87 47 AYMKD
1069, 1173–78 (Turk.).
129. Id. at 1153–55.
130. Id. at 1161–61, 1168–70.
131. Anayasa Mahkemesi [AYM] [Constitutional Court] June 3, 2016, E. 2016/54, K. 2016/117 53
AYMKD 915, 923 (Turk).
132. See Tarik Olcay, The Unamendability of Amendable Clauses: The Case of the Turkish Constitution, in
AN UNAMENDABLE CONSTITUTION? UNAMENDABILITY IN CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACIES 313, 337 (Richard
Albert & Bertil Emrah Oder eds., 2018).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 336–37.
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IV. THE TRIUMPH OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN FRANCE
France illustrates the popular sovereigntist resistance to the doctrine of
unconstitutional amendment. Although the French Constitution codifies an
unamendability clause, the Constitutional Council has taken the view that
amendments to the constitution are manifestations of popular sovereignty that
cannot be reviewed on substantive grounds.135 As the birthplace of the theory of
constituent power, France is a noteworthy exception to the trend toward the
judicial review of constitutional amendments around the world. Amendments
are not reviewable in court—a rule that derives not from constitutional design
but from judicial interpretation.136
A. CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT IN FRANCE
Amending the French Constitution is no easy feat.137 The constitution
grants the President (at the request of the Prime Minister) and members of
Parliament the authority to initiate a constitutional amendment.138 Once an
amendment bill is introduced in Parliament, it must be passed in identical terms
in both the National Assembly and the Senate.139 If the bill is adopted in both
houses, the President can either submit the bill to Parliament for approval or put
it to referendum.140 If it is submitted to Parliament, both houses convene together
as a Congress and the bill becomes official it is approved by at least three-fifths
of all votes cast.141 However, if the President chooses to put the bill to a
referendum, a simple majority vote is required to make it official.142
The constitution does not by its text authorize the Constitutional Council
to exercise the power of judicial review over constitutional amendments. But it
does formalize explicit limitations on amendment. The constitution prohibits
amendments to the republican form of government,143 and it also expressly
disallows any amendment when there is a threat to the integrity of the French
national territory144 or when there is a vacancy in the office of the presidency.145

135. Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Council] decision No. 62-20DC, Nov. 6, 1962, Rec. 27
(Fr.), translated in NORMAN DORSEN ET AL., COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: CASES AND MATERIALS 97
(3d ed. 2016); Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Council] decision No. 2003-469DC, Mar. 26, 2003,
Rec. 293 (Fr.).
136. Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Council] decision No. 62-20DC, Nov. 6, 1962, Rec. 27
(Fr.), translated in DORSEN ET AL., supra note 135, at 97; Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Council]
decision No. 2003-469DC, Mar. 26, 2003, Rec. 293, (Fr.).
137. See 1958 CONST. art. 89 (rev. 2008) (Fr.) (detailing the arduous process for amendment).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. art. 7.
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There have been over twenty amendments to the current French
Constitution.146 Neither of the first two amendments complied with the ordinary
procedures of constitutional amendment. The first was adopted using special
procedures in article 85 for amendments to articles 77 through 87 involving the
French Community. That was the only use of article 85, which has since been
repealed along with articles 78 through 87.147
The second was far more significant to the course of modern French
constitutional history. Four years after founding of the Fifth Republic in 1958,
President Charles de Gaulle became convinced that the president should no
longer be elected by an Electoral College but instead by direct popular vote.148
A change of this magnitude required a constitutional amendment, but it was
politically unlikely that the houses of Parliament would propose the amendment
on de Gaulle’s behalf. De Gaulle found an alternative: he would bypass
Parliament and invoke a special procedure in article 11, which authorizes the
President to submit any bill on “the organization of the public authorities” to a
referendum.149 Until 1962, this provision had not generally been interpreted as
a vehicle for constitutional amendment.150 De Gaulle’s tactic was therefore quite
controversial at the time and widely regarded as unconstitutional.151 The Council
of State formally reproached the use of article 11 for constitutional amendment
as unconstitutional, whereas the Constitutional Council did so informally.152 The
President of the Senate and the opposition saw de Gaulle’s move as an
“outrageous breach of the Constitution.”153 Undeterred, de Gaulle pressed ahead
with his unconventional plan to amend presidential selection using article 11,
and the people went to the polls in referendum. The referendum passed with a
nearly two-thirds approval (about 61.75 % voting yes).154
In the aftermath of the vote, the Senate President challenged the
constitutionality of the amendment before the Constitutional Council.155 He
argued that the law was not properly a constitutional act (loi constitutionnelle)
or an organic law, but rather just an ordinary law.156 He also argued that its
adoption by referendum did not shield it from review by the Council.157 He

146. See generally id. (listing throughout the various amendments).
147. Id. arts. 76, 77 (noting the repeal of articles 78 through 86).
148. David B. Goldey, The French Referendum and Election of 1962: The National Campaigns, 11 POL.
STUD. 287, 288 (1963).
149. Id. at 289–90.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 290.
153. JOHN BELL, FRENCH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 134 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).
154. MARK CLARENCE WALKER, THE STRATEGIC USE OF REFERENDUMS: POWER, LEGITIMACY, AND
DEMOCRACY 35 (2003).
155. Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Council] decision No. 62-20DC, Nov. 6, 1962, Rec. 27
(Fr.), translated in DORSEN ET AL., supra note 135, at 97.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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contended further that the exercise of national sovereignty, whether by the
people or their representatives, should be in accordance with the clear rules set
out in the constitution.158 The Council rejected the Senate President’s challenge
by a vote of six to four.159 In its judgment, the Council focused on its own
constitutional competence. It stressed that its authority was bound narrowly by
the text of the constitution and also by the organic law on the Constitutional
Council.160 In its short decision, the Council distinguished “direct expression[s]
of national sovereignty” (referendums) from “activities of public authorities”
(lois), the former resting on a higher plane than the latter.161 The court concluded
that neither the constitution nor the organic law gave the Council the power to
review the constitutionality of a “bill adopted by the French people by way of
referendum.”162
The Council’s judgment stands for the proposition that courts will not
review the choice of the people to amend the constitution in a referendum. This
presumably applied to constitutional referendums under both articles 11 and 89,
though it remained an open question whether courts would review the
constitutionality of an amendment passed by Parliament without recourse to a
referendum.163 The Council hinted at an answer thirty years later in 1992. After
the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, sixty senators asked the Council to rule on
the Treaty’s conformity with the French Constitution.164 The senators claimed
that the Treaty violated article 3 of the constitution, which establishes that
“national sovereignty shall vest in the people, who shall exercise it through their
representatives and by means of referendum.”165 In response, the Council
suggested that constituent authority is sovereign and subject only to the
unamendable rules, both substantive and temporal.166 The Council was speaking
specifically about constituent authority and only generally about amendment,
but seemed to suggest that the explicit limitations on amendment are
enforceable.
The court finally answered the question a decade later in 2003. Sixty
senators again challenged the constitutionality of an amendment, this time the
Constitutional Law on Decentralized Organization of the Republic.167 The
amendment had been the first to be passed by a joint meeting of the National
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id.
Id. For the number of votes, see BELL, supra note 153.
CC, decision no. 62-20DC, ¶ 1.
Id. ¶ 2.
Id. ¶ 5.
Sophie Boyron, From Abolition to Amendment: Life and Death of Constitutions in France, in THE
CREATION AND AMENDMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL NORMS 133, 147 (Mads Andenas ed., 2000).
164. Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Council] decision No. 92-312DC, Sept. 2, 1992, Rec. 76
(Fr.).
165. 1958 CONST. art. 3(1) (rev. 2008) (Fr.).
166. CC, decision no. 92-312DC, ¶ 19.
167. Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Council] decision No. 2003-469DC, Mar. 26, 2003, Rec.
293 (Fr.).
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Assembly and the Senate under the procedure specified in article 89 that was
later challenged at the Council.168 The Senators invoked the formal
unamendability of the republican form of government, and argued that this
unamendability did not prohibit a return to monarchy alone, but also protected
the fundamental characteristics of the French Republic.169 The Senators argued
that decentralizing local government was a violation of the unitary character of
the state.170 In response, the Council echoed its holding of four decades prior. Its
judgment focused on its own competence and ultimately held that since no
provision of the constitution confers upon it the power to review constitutional
amendments, it had no jurisdiction to hear the case.171 The rule in France, then,
seems to be that courts will not review the constitutionality of any amendment
at all.
B. DEFERENCE TO POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY
Despite the formal entrenchment of an unamendable rule in the French
Constitution, the Constitutional Council has elected to treat them as judicially
unenforceable. The reason why appears to rest on the court’s peculiar, though
not improper, understanding of the relationship between popular sovereignty
and constitutional change. To be specific, the court equates the constitutional
amendment power to constituent power, and interprets constitutional
amendments as direct expressions of popular sovereignty.
The 1962 decision on the constitutionality of the electoral reform
referendum reveals that the court rejected the theory of delegation. According to
the court, when the French people speak through a referendum they are
exercising not a delegated, constituted power but rather a full proprietary
constituent power of their own.172 The consequence of the court’s approach is to
equate constitution-making with constitutional amendment, the result being that
there can be no limitations on what the people can do if they choose to do so in
a referendum. The people could even elect in a referendum to amend or abolish
one of the unamendable rules in the French Constitution. Under the
Constitutional Council’s understanding of the authority of the people, such an
unfettered amendment power amounts to an exercise of original constituent
power.
The Council regards the constituent power as sovereign, when referring to
the people acting as the constitution-amender. For the court, since amendments
168. For a discussion of the context and substance of this constitutional reform, see Xavier Philippe, France:
The Amendment of the French Constitution “On the Decentralized Organization of the Republic,” 2 INT’L J.
CONST. L. 691 (2004).
169. CC, decision No. 2003-469DC, pt. II.2; see also Sophie Boyron, France, in HOW CONSTITUTIONS
CHANGE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 115, 128 (Dawn Oliver & Carlo Fusaro eds., 2011).
170. CC, decision No. 2003-469DC, pt. III.1.
171. Id.
172. Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Council] decision No. 62-20DC, Nov. 6, 1962, Rec. 27,
¶ 5 (Fr.), translated in DORSEN ET AL., supra note 135, at 97.
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emanate from the sovereign, they are final and unreviewable.173 This attribution
of sovereign authority to the constitutional amendment power echoes the theory
of constituent power in Israel as resting in the Knesset, the national legislature.
The Knesset is understood to possess “ongoing” constituent power,174 always
ready to be deployed to make or unmake constitution-level laws without needing
to mobilize a separate body clothed in a higher authority. In France, what has
occurred is a similar formalization of how to exercise constituent power, only
the vehicle for its exercise is not the legislature as in Israel, but rather the people
themselves speaking in the referendum.175 De Gaulle’s legacy, then, is at least
partly to sever the connection between popular sovereignty and the national
legislature,176 and to validate by practice that the people are simultaneously
constitutional and constituent actors.
French theorist Jean-Jacques Rousseau once wrote that “a people is always
free to change its laws, even the best of them; for if it chooses to do itself harm,
who has the right to stop it?”177 The jurisprudence of the Constitutional Council
to date seems to accord with Rousseau: the people are sovereign and no entity
but the people themselves may invalidate a constitutional change. Nonetheless,
one could imagine that the Council could justify reviewing an amendment for
its procedural correctness, just as the Council could also review the
constitutionality of an amendment that violates one of the constitution’s
temporal limitations—both are nonetheless consistent with its theory equating
amending actors with constituent power.
V. THE NATURE AND LIMITS OF FORMALIST RESISTANCE
Georgia, Turkey, and France have so far resisted the growing trend toward
adopting the doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional amendment. The
foundations of their resistance differ, as do whether and how the resistance is
legally required. Additionally, they differ as to how their resistance manifests
itself in the course of adjudicating a challenge to the constitutionality of an
amendment. In this Part, we briefly compare these three jurisdictional
encounters with the idea of an unconstitutional amendment, and we explore their
limitations.

173. Wanda Mastor & Liliane Icher, Constitutional Amendment in France, in ENGINEERING
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON EUROPE, CANADA AND THE USA 115, 118
(Xenophon Contiades ed., 2013).
174. Claude Klein, Basic Laws, Constituent Power and Judicial Review of Statutes in Israel: Bank
Hamizrahi United v. Kfar Chitufi Migdal and Others, 2 EUR. PUB. L. 225, 230–33 (1996).
175. Lucien Jaume, Constituent Power in France: The Revolution and Its Consequences, in THE PARADOX
OF CONSTITUTIONALISM: CONSTITUENT POWER AND CONSTITUTIONAL FORM 67, 68 (Martin Loughlin & Neil
Walker eds., 2007).
176. Id. at 79.
177. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 89 (Christopher Betts trans., Oxford World’s
Classics ed., Oxford University Press 2009) (1762).
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A. THE BOUNDARIES OF THE CONSTITUTION
Whether an amendment can be constitutional is inextricably linked to a
question of enduring fascination and complexity: what is the constitution? In the
United States, when the First Congress convened after the adoption of their
Constitution, a powerful distinction was made between the Constitution and its
amendments.178 The American Constitution was seen as more authoritative than
the amendments made to it. The Constitution was a specially-constituted
agreement among federal and state actors whereas amendments, according to
one important view at the time, were rooted in an inferior authority because they
were primarily acts of the states.179 It may well be worth contrasting the
differential authority between the Constitution and its amendments, but the
American experience suggests that amendments might sometimes stand on
higher authority if the standard is the ratification threshold. Article VII states the
rule for ratifying the Constitution: the approval of nine states out of thirteen was
sufficient for the Constitution to take effect.180 Yet the Article V threshold for
ratifying a mere amendment was ten out of thirteen states.181
Whether a constitution and its amendments are taken to stand on equal
footing controls the answer to the question whether an amendment can be
unconstitutional. The justification for an unconstitutional amendment—and for
a court’s power to invalidate it as a result—derives from the cardinal rule of the
delegation theory of constitutional change: A constitution rests on authority
superior to an amendment because only the constituent power can authorize the
making of a constitution while changes to it are the province of a lesser
constituted power. It therefore follows that an exercise of a constituted power to
make a decision that is properly made only by the constituent power—in this
context, to make a fundamental change to the constitution that exceeds the scope
of an amendment—cannot survive a court’s review because it amounts to a
corruption of the limited authority delegated to the constituted power.
Neither Georgia nor France sees any such boundary between constitution
and amendment, though their operating theories are at some variance. For
Georgia, there is no formal difference between its constitution and an
amendment to it, whereas in France there is indeed a formal difference between
them but no functional difference.
To understand why, we must return first to Georgia. The Constitutional
Court has denied all bids to review the constitutionality of an amendment
because, on its theory of constitutional change, once an amendment is properly
enacted according to the procedural strictures in the codified constitution, that
amendment becomes not a mere appendage to the constitution but rather it
178. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 734 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
179. Id. at 735.
180. U.S. CONST. art. VII (“The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient for the
Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the Same.”).
181. Id. art. V (requiring the agreement of three-quarters of the states to ratify an amendment proposal).
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becomes the constitution, equal in form, status and authority to it. As a
consequence, the Georgian Constitutional Court does not entertain the
possibility of invalidating an amendment since that would be akin to invalidating
the constitution itself, something which, for the court, is a logical incongruity
and therefore theoretically and in reality out of bounds.182
The French resistance to invalidating an amendment rests on a different
theory but reaches the same result. For the Constitutional Council, an
amendment properly made through a referendum is different in form from the
constitution itself: the amendment is recognized as a modification to the
constitution and it is understood to be a separate and distinguishable part of the
constitution when and if it ultimately becomes valid. Yet when it is approved by
the people in a referendum, the amendment attains an impregnable status that
makes it impervious to invalidation by a court. The reason why returns us to the
delegation theory of constitutional change. The amendment-by-referendum is
treated as functionally indistinguishable from the constitution itself, both arising
out of the same or similar source of popular authority and neither properly
susceptible to reversal by any institution other than the people themselves in a
subsequent referendum or in a future choice to write an altogether new
constitution.
Even when an amendment in France is approved by the people’s
representatives in Parliament, it is insulated from substantive judicial review.
The result in France of amendment-by-Parliament brings the country into
formation with Georgia since in both countries amendments made by political
actors—as opposed to those made directly by the people in a referendum—are
unreviewable in court. In Georgia, it is because an amendment possesses the
same status as the constitution, and in France it is because the Council has ruled
that it has no jurisdiction to review the content of the parliamentary amendment.
The risks are clear in both the Georgian and French cases. It is possible in
either instance to contemplate the possibility of an amendment denying or
diminishing minoritarian civil and political rights, imposing archaic restrictions
in the name of national security, marginalizing the forces of official opposition
or consolidating power in the hands of the governing party or executive. Were
either high court to remain consistent with their precedents, they would be
constrained to accept as valid any of these amendments as long as their
ratification complied with the procedures required by the constitution. No
amendment is reversible, whether it is adopted by the people speaking directly
through a referendum or the constituted organs of government.
In Turkey, the Constitutional Court has in turn both respected and breached
the boundaries of the constitution. Recall that the constitution entrenches several
items against formal amendment but importantly limits the court to reviewing

182. For a discussion of the different manifestations of unconstitutional constitutions, see Richard Albert,
Four Unconstitutional Constitutions and Their Democratic Foundations, 50 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 169 (2017).
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amendments only as to their form. Rarely since 1961 has the court adhered to
this limitation in its many iterations. The court has exceeded its authority to
review amendments even where the defect in the amendment relates to substance
and not to form. The court has tried to classify what it regards as substantive
defects into formal ones but these have been transparent efforts to do circuitously
what the constitution plainly does not allow directly. For the Turkish
Constitutional Court then, the boundaries the constitution has set around its
authority have not been effective to prevent the court from achieving its
constitutional objectives on questions the court believes are of the highest
importance, including most prominently the secular character of the state.
B. CODIFIED AND UNCODIFIED RULES OF EXCEPTION
Each of these three jurisdictions therefore reveals a different approach
recognizing the valid exercise of constituent power. In Georgia, the amendment
power is understood to function as the constitution-making power, fusing the
constituted and constituent powers into the same body of amending actors. We
can describe the self-understanding of Georgian constitutionalism as
constitutionalizing the constituent power in its amendment rules. Where political
actors deploy the amendment rules to make a change of any kind to the
constitution, that change is taken to have been driven by a reactivation of the
constituent power, whose choice of change, whatever it is, cannot be overruled
by courts once it becomes final.
To the extent there is an exception to this rule in Georgia, it may implicitly
be what is made explicit in Turkey. A constitutional amendment, in order to be
valid, must comply strictly with the procedures outlined in the codified text. If
the Georgian Constitutional Court is satisfied that the procedure for a
constitutional amendment has fallen short of the expectation set by the
constitution or is otherwise defective, the court may find it appropriate to take
action to ensure that political actors conform with the constitution’s own rules.
The contrary choice—to allow departures from the constitution’s formal
amendment rules—would undermine the organizing logic of the Georgian
Constitutional Court’s ultra-formalist approach to constitutional change. But it
is not difficult to imagine the court declaring that its hands are tied in the face of
a procedurally defective amendment if the challenge to the amendment is
registered only after the amendment is ratified, because it would have achieved
constitution-level status and immunity from challenge. This is the great paradox,
and problem, of the Georgian theory of amendment-as-constitution.
In France, the Constitutional Council has acquiesced to a significant
measure of procedural irregularity and validated the outcome. It is important to
stress that the court has not accepted all manner of procedural irregularity. The
ones that have mattered for our purposes in this inquiry into formalist regimes
are the changes that have been supported by popular consent in a referendum.
Even where the amendment procedure has defied the codified rules of change,
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the court has not challenged the procedure or its outcome if the vehicle has been
popular choice in a referendum. Procedural correctness in relation to the codified
text, then, is not a primary concern of the court. This is an important contrast
between the French Constitutional Council and the Turkish Constitutional
Court.
There is a further point worth making about France. Unlike what appears
to be true of the Georgian Constitutional Court’s interpretation of the Georgian
Constitution, constituent power in France is not constitutionalized in codified
text, but it has nonetheless been constitutionalized in practice. Political actors
know in advance that a popular referendum can be deployed to make and remake
the French Constitution in a fundamental way. There is no need to convene a
special assembly for that purpose, nor must political actors innovate an
altogether new procedure to create a new constitutional regime, though they may
do so if they and the people wish. Instead, the roadmap to both minor and
wholesale constitutional change is much more simple: the people may speak
through a referendum to reflect the highest authority in the French constitutional
order. In both Georgia and France, then, we know what is accepted in the selfunderstanding of each political community as a valid exercise of constituent
power before a major change is attempted. In contrast, it is not unusual in other
states to wait until after a major change is attempted or made to be in a position
to evaluate whether, if it is successful, the change is an exercise of constituent
power. Indeed, a judicial determination that a given constitutional change has
not been validated by the constituent power is often the principal reason why
courts invalidate constitutional amendments.
Turkey offers a twist: although the constitution is understood to be an
expression of the constituent power’s wish to restrain the court in its evaluation
of amendments, the court has taken the view that its substantive review of
amendments is a proper defense of the values identified as foundational by the
constituent power. We therefore see in Turkey conflicting understandings of the
role of the court. Where the Turkish Constitutional Court has exceeded its
constitutional authorization to review amendments as to their form alone, one
could reasonably claim that the court is violating the commands of the
constituent power that authorized the constitution and that specifically restricted
the role of the court in matters of constitutional change. On another view,
however, one could make a contrary claim when faced with the same facts: that
the court’s departure from its narrow authorization in the constitution is an effort
to defend the values, principles, and rules from attack by those who would
undermine the constitution approved by the constituent power. Where one stands
turns on how important one believes the codified constitutional text should be
because it is unmistakably clear that the current Turkish Constitution intends to
constrain the range of authority of the court in relation to constitutional
amendments. Both the French and Georgian courts reject the historical Turkish
approach—to exceed the constitution’s mandate and to exercise substantive
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review of amendments—but that approach is no longer dominant since the
Turkish Constitutional Court has returned to reviewing the constitutionality of
amendments as to their form alone. Codification has ascended again to
importance in Turkey.
CONCLUSION—A NEEDED COUNTERWEIGHT IN CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE
We began this inquiry with a challenge: faced with what appears by its
momentum and popularity to be an emerging trend to adopt the doctrine of
unconstitutional constitutional amendment, we sought to bring to light
alternatives that show other ways courts might respond to the question whether
an amendment can be unconstitutional. We have highlighted three different
alternatives—one each from Georgia, Turkey, and France—that together
represent variations on the same theme. They are all examples of formalist
resistance to unconstitutional constitutional amendments.
Each model has its own limitations. The Georgian model of ultra-formalist
review of constitutional amendments strikes us as rigid and mechanistic, though
some might regard it as thoughtless. We believe it is fairly described as reflecting
a theory of amendment-as-constitution, the idea that the product of
constitution-changing has the same constitution-level status as the product of
constitution-making. The Turkish model of proceduralism seems promising as a
way to cabin the power of courts to invalidate amendments but it is subject to
manipulation, as history has shown time and again. The Turkish Constitutional
Court’s recurring strategy of integrating substantive review of amendments into
its procedural review is, by all historical accounts, a distortion of what was
intended by the design of the constitution’s formal amendment rules. Yet if
constitutional designers wish to restrict courts to only procedural review, the
Turkish Constitution offers evidence of how the design can both function and
malfunction. In France, there is a purity to the country’s model of popular
sovereignty insofar as the Constitutional Council will acquiesce to the people’s
expressions of self-determination through a referendum, even if the popular
choice is inconsistent with the constitution’s most fundamental commitments.
This purity, of course, comes with serious consequences where the people’s
choice concerns minority rights.
The takeaway of our inquiry can be stated in one phrase: we should not
take the increasing prevalence of the doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional
amendment as evidence of its appropriateness for all constitutional states. The
doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional amendment is not a necessary feature
of modern constitutionalism, nor of modern liberal democratic
constitutionalism, and it remains open to constitutional states to explore
alternatives that cohere their own constitutional traditions. It is crucial in this
age of the harmonizing tendencies of globalization to diversify the options
available to constitutional actors so they may choose not the path of least
resistance, but the path they believe is best suited to their state and its peoples.

